Merger policy: what can we learn from experiments? by Götte, Lorenz & Schmutzler, Armin
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2009
Merger policy: what can we learn from experiments?
Götte, L; Schmutzler, A
Götte, L; Schmutzler, A (2009). Merger policy: what can we learn from experiments? In: Hinloopen, J; Normann, H
T. Experiments and Competition Policy. Cambridge, 185-216.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Hinloopen, J; Normann, H T 2009. Experiments and Competition Policy. Cambridge, 185-216.
Götte, L; Schmutzler, A (2009). Merger policy: what can we learn from experiments? In: Hinloopen, J; Normann, H
T. Experiments and Competition Policy. Cambridge, 185-216.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Hinloopen, J; Normann, H T 2009. Experiments and Competition Policy. Cambridge, 185-216.
Merger Policy: What can we learn from
experiments?
Lorenz Götte*
(University of Zurich, CEPR)
and
Armin Schmutzler**
(University of Zurich, CEPR, ENCORE)
Abstract: This paper surveys experimental literature relating to mergers.
We put particular emphasis on discussing whether this literature addresses the
issues that are relevant for competition policy. We also include some suggestions
as to how the fit between the experiments and the requirements of competition
policy research might be improved.
–––––––––––––––––––––
Aﬃliations: *Lorenz Götte, Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung,
Blümlisalpstr. 10, CH-8006 Zürich, http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/goette/
**Armin Schmutzler, Sozialökonomisches Institut, Blümlisalpstr. 10, CH-
8006 Zürich, http://www.soi.unizh.ch/
We are grateful to Stefan Bühler, Hans-Theo Normann, Jan Potters
and Dario Sacco for helpful comments.
1
1 Introduction
So far, the explicit laboratory analysis of merger policy has been limited to
very few examples, even though during the last few decades experimental
economists provided many contributions directed at understanding imper-
fectly competitive markets. One might expect such industrial organization
experiments to provide some insight into merger policy, even when they were
not designed immediately for this purpose. Therefore, this survey attempts
to clarify the role that experiments can play in answering the following ques-
tions.
1. Which eﬀects do mergers have on the profits of the inside firms, on
their competitors, and on consumer welfare? On a related note, under
which circumstances should a merger be allowed?
2. Under which circumstances are mergers likely to occur? How close is
the relation between conditions that are likely to generate mergers and
conditions under which mergers are desirable? In other words, under
which conditions do the decisions of firms lead to the “right kind of
mergers"?
3. When policy decisions about mergers have to be taken without precise
information about whether the theoretical conditions for allowing them
are fulfilled, what kind of simple proxies should be used to determine
that the circumstances are right?
4. What kind of remedies might be useful to alleviate the negative com-
petition eﬀects of certain mergers while preserving whatever synergies
there may be?
To analyze these questions, two aspects of mergers must be taken into
account. First, a merger creates a new entity that diﬀers in some important
way from each of its components. The new firm typically controls more assets
than each of its predecessors: It may have more capacity or a greater product
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spectrum. Also, it may have access to more technological and organizational
knowledge, which should increase its eﬃciency. Negative eﬀects are also
conceivable: The larger firm may be harder to manage, the organizational
cultures might not fit, etc. Second, just like the exit of a firm, a merger
between two firms means that the total number of firms is reduced, at least
if the merger does not spark oﬀ new entry.
A useful starting point for the analysis of mergers, whether in theory or
in the lab, is to focus on the second eﬀect and abstract from the important
fact that a merger creates an entity that diﬀers from its predecessors in
some sense. Specifically, one of the most influential theory papers in the
area (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983, henceforth SSR) treats a merger
between symmetric firms in much the same way as the exit of one of its
constituent parts: Only one of the two original firms remains in the market,
which is completely indistinguishable from its predecessors. In this case, we
use the terminology pseudo-merger as opposed to a real merger where the
new firm diﬀers in some way from at least one of its components. While a
full-fledged analysis of mergers must ultimately take into account that the
new firm diﬀers from each of its predecessors, decomposing the eﬀects of a
merger into the exit of one firm and a change in the assets of the other one
helps to understand what is going on.
Similarly, the timing aspects of mergers can be simplified. In the real
world, mergers involve the transformation of an old market structure into a
new one: Each firm has a pre-merger history, on the basis of which expec-
tations about the post-merger situation are formed. A large chunk of theo-
retical and experimental work in the field simplifies the analysis by ignoring
the time dimension. In this literature, market structures are investigated
in a comparative statics fashion rather than in an explicitly dynamic way.
The papers consider several versions of static oligopoly games which diﬀer
only with respect to the number of firms. In principle, comparison of such
games with diﬀerent numbers of players can help us to understand the ef-
fects of mergers, with large numbers of players corresponding to pre-merger
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situations and small numbers to post-merger situations. However, there is a
severe disadvantage of such a procedure: Players are not clearly in the role
of insiders or outsiders to a merger, so that there are limits to what we can
learn from these papers.
Fortunately, there is a small group of papers that does not suﬀer from this
deficiency: They consider experiments where an oligopoly game is played for
a certain number of periods, after which a merger, or, in our terminology, a
pseudo-merger takes place.1 The oligopoly game is then continued with the
reduced number of players. In such a setting, players have clearly defined
roles as insiders and outsiders, so that the eﬀects of the merger on the diﬀerent
groups of players can be addressed more directly.
Thus, we can categorize diﬀerent approaches to merger analysis as in
Table 1, which classifies existing experimental research on horizontal mergers.
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Asset Dimension → Pseudo-Merger Real Mergers
↓ Time Dimension
Static Huck et al. (2004) Isaac and
Dufwenberg and Reynolds (1999)
Gneezy (2000)
Dynamic Huck et al. (2003) Davis and Holt (1994)
Davis and Wilson (2000)
Table 1: Experimental Literature on Horizontal Mergers
Except for some comments towards the end of the paper, we shall not
discuss whether there are fundamental reasons to distrust laboratory exper-
iments as a means of understanding the strategic role of firms. Rather, we
1In the lab, the "merger" is typically implemented by randomly selecting two players,
designating one of them as a decision maker for the new firm and sending the other player
away or letting him act as an "advisor" to the decision-maker.
2Vertical and conglomerate mergers typically belong to the right column, as both types
of mergers change the set of goods that the firms produce.
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shall give the benefit of doubt to the experimentators, asking merely whether
the particular experiments chosen are suitable to analyze the policy issues
arising in merger policy.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys experiments that
are relevant to horizontal mergers. Section 3 discusses to which extent these
experiments can help to answer the policy questions discussed above. In
Sections 4 and 5, we discuss vertical and conglomerate mergers respectively.
The concluding Section 6 will argue that the relatively small impact of the
experimental literature on merger policy analysis is justified in view of the
fairly limited contributions that this literature has made so far: Some useful
individual contributions notwithstanding, there does not seem to be a re-
search program that matches the needs of competition policy. We will also
argue, however, that, in spite of some intrinsic limitations, experiments can
potentially play a useful role in infoming merger policy.
2 Horizontal Mergers
This section summarizes the experimental research on horizontal mergers,
embedding it into the context of existing theoretical research on competition
policy. We analyze each column of Table 1 in turn.
2.1 Pseudo-Mergers
2.1.1 Static Approaches
We first discuss the theoretical and experimental results that can be obtained
for pseudo-mergers in a static setting, by comparing oligopolies with diﬀerent
numbers of firms.
Most of this research deals with the standard linear Cournot oligopoly
model with homogeneous firms: The analysis compares the performance of
markets with n firms with identical marginal costs with otherwise identical
markets with n− 1 of these firms. The n-firm market is interpreted as “pre-
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merger” and the (n− 1)-firm market as “post-merger”. Thus, neither are
there any initial diﬀerences in market shares nor does the merger create such
diﬀerences.
Several theoretical predictions in this setting are rather plausible.
Proposition 1 In the homogeneous linear Cournot model, a pseudo-merger
between two firms
(i) increases prices;
(ii) reduces total output;
(iii) increases the output of each individual firm.
More controversial, however, is an implication pointed out by SSR. They
compared the profits of two of the n firms in the pre-merger situation with
those of one of the n − 1 firms in the post-merger situation, interpreting
the former quantity as the joint profits of the merger insiders and the latter
as the post-merger profits of the new firm. They arrived at the following
conclusion.
Proposition 2 In the homogeneous linear Cournot model, the parties to a
pseudo-merger have higher total stand-alone profits than the new entity has
as joint profits except when n = 2.
Therefore, from the point of view of their owners, firms should not merge
in the first place. Unlike the insiders, the outside firms unambiguously benefit
from the merger, because it relaxes competition, leading to higher equilib-
rium prices and per-firm profits. Thus, there are positive merger externalities.
Both consumers and merging parties are worse oﬀ. Also, total welfare, mea-
sured as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, falls. Though
total profits are higher, this cannot compensate for the lower consumer sur-
plus.
The solution to the “paradox” that the merging parties lose out is quite
simple: SSR use a framework where mergers are not really mergers: In fact,
they are equivalent to the disappearance of one of the two firms involved.
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The merged entity cannot be distinguished from its competitors, as it is
not “bigger” in any meaningful way. It does not have more assets, a larger
product spectrum or a better technology. It does not have greater internal
coordination problems, and it does not suﬀer from clashes of organizational
cultures either. It is just like everybody else. Thus, while the new firm
has higher profits than each of its constituent parts used to have, it is not
better oﬀ than any outsider. Its profit is just the typical profit a firm in an
(n− 1)-firm market. The total stand-alone profits of the two parties before
the merger were twice the typical profit of a firm in an n-firm market.
With one exception to be discussed below, laboratory analysis has not
dealt directly with the “merger paradox”. Much eﬀort, however, has been
devoted to the underlying comparative statics with respect to prices and
quantities, that is, to Proposition 1.
The design of the prototypical experiment in this category is as follows:
Subjects were given instructions on the game to be played. They receive a
profit table that relates their choice of output and the output of all others to
profits. Subjects are then asked to answer control questions, ensuring that
they understood the instructions and ensuring that they know that all other
participants understood the instructions, too. The typical experiment is one
where individuals play the Cournot game repeatedly (typically, for 20 to 30
times), facing the same competitors in each round. After each round, the
subjects receive feedback: They are informed how much they have earned
and of the choices of their competitors (which is suﬃcient to figure out how
much their competitors earned).
In most of the experimental designs with Cournot competition, the Nash
equilibrium predicts the outcomes rather well. In particular, the expected
comparative-statics prediction holds.
Experimental Result 1 Reducing the number of firms in a static pseudo-
merger setting lowers total output, much like the theory predicts.
With the exception of Huck et al. (2004), few papers formally compare
how the number of firms aﬀects outcomes in these experiments. In partic-
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ular, is there a systematic tendency towards more collusive outcomes when
the number of firms is small? In a meta analysis of roughly comparable
experiments that diﬀer in the number of firms, there is a weak relationship
between the distance of the outcome to the equilibrium and the number of
firms (see Huck et al., 2004).3 In their own experiments, Huck et al. find that
outputs in markets with only two firms are on average ten percent below the
equilibrium quantity. Outputs in markets with five firms are on average 7
percent above. This might lead one to conclude that the collusion-enhancing
eﬀects of mergers are larger than theory would suggest. Whether the eﬀect
is large enough to warrant such a conclusion is a matter of taste.4
The subjects in a Cournot experiment essentially face a public goods
problem: Restricting output would be eﬃcient for the industry as a whole,
but is not individually rational.5 Hence, it is interesting to compare the
outcomes in Cournot experiments to the large literature on experiments that
are explicitly framed as public goods. While, in the typical public goods
experiment, convergence to equilibrium is slower, the outcome in the final
few periods is very close to the Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt,
1999).6 It is not surprising that convergence in public goods experiments is
3In the treatments considered, there is neither communication nor discounting. Also,
subjects are matched with the same opponents throughout the experiment and are only
informed about aggregate behavior of opponents. Most experiments have symmetric firms.
4Dufwenberg and Gneezy (1999) find much clearer eﬀects in this direction in a Bertrand
model with a homogenous good. In their treatment with three competitors, behavior
slowly converges to the equilibrium prediction. However, in the treatment with only two
firms, behavior initially converges to equilibrium, but diverges from equilibrium behavior
in the last few periods. The substantial diﬀerence between the two and three-firm treat-
ments seems closely related to the counterintuitive notion that the number of firms has
no eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome in Bertrand oligopolies. It is not surprising that the
experiments lead to diﬀerent outcomes than the implausible benchmark equilibrium.
5Choosing a low output in the Cournot model increases the equilibrium price, which
is beneficial for all competitiors. Thus, like supplying a public good, restricting output
involves positive externalities on the other players.
6There are institutions under which public goods experiments do not converge, and
they are important. However, they are not relevant to our context here. See Fehr and
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slower. In these experiments, the equilibrium involves zero contributions.
Hence, any error the subjects make moves them away from the equilibrium.
On the other hand, in Cournot games, unsystematic errors do not move the
outcomes systematically away from the equilibrium.7It is also instructive to
compare the results on the eﬀects of the numbers of players to the research
on public goods experiments: There, the number of players has a relatively
small eﬀect on the extent of deviation from the Nash prediction (see Isaac,
Walker and Arlington, 1994).8
An interesting extension of the literature reviewed in this section is Lindqvist
and Stennek (2005). Unlike the papers discussed above, they do not merely
carry out comparative statics with respect to the number of firms. Rather,
following the endogenous merger theory of Kamien and Zang (1993), they
explicitly model merger decisions in the laboratory, showing how they depend
on the structure of the underlying product market profits. They consider a
three-player setting where one player (the buyer) can make merger oﬀers to
the two others (the sellers), which they can accept or reject.9 If both sellers
accept, there is a merger to monopoly, whereas, if only one seller consents, a
merger to duopoly takes place. The authors test how the decision to merge
depends on the size of duopoly profits when they leave monopoly and tri-
opoly profits constant. As one would expect, a ceteris paribus increase in
the size of the duopoly profit significantly reduces the number of mergers to
monopoly: Intuitively, a higher duopoly profit corresponds to high outside
options of the sellers. The paper constitutes an interesting step into the di-
rection of analyzing endogenous mergers in the lab; it remains to be seen
whether further analysis will follow.
Gaechter (2000) for a discussion.
7In public goods experiments with an interior equilibrium as in Cournot games, equi-
librium is reached very quickly. See, e.g., Falkinger et al. (1999).
8A recent meta-analysis of 349 primary sources (Zelmer 2003) confirms this impression.
9The authors consider both treatments where the two oﬀers are made simultaneously
and the two acceptance decisions are made simultaneously, as well as sequential settings.
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2.1.2 Dynamic Setting
Next, we move to the lower left corner of Table 1. Theoretical analysis that
treats the eﬀects of a merger by distinguishing explicitly between pre-merger
and post-merger behavior is very rare. Levin (1990) takes such an approach.
He supposes that, before the merger, firms act as Cournot players, whereas
after the merger the new firm may adopt a diﬀerent role. For instance, it may
act as a Stackelberg leader to which the competitors adapt their behavior.
As a result, outputs and profits of the new firm may be higher than for the
competitors, even when firms are symmetric ex ante and the merger does not
aﬀect technology.
Inspired by Levin’s paper, Huck, Konrad, Müller and Normann (2003),
henceforth HKMN, explore the idea that a merger might have psychological
eﬀects distinguishing the behavior of the new firms from the competitors.
They consider a 50-period experiment. In a typical treatment, an initial
number of n firms plays a symmetric homogeneous linear Cournot (“pre-
merger”) oligopoly game for the first 25 periods. Then, two of the players are
randomly chosen as parties to a merger. One of them is assigned the role of
a decision maker, the other one can act as an “advisor” by suggesting output
decisions. The post-merger game continues for another 25 periods, without
any changes in the underlying technology. Thus, using the terminology of
Section 1, the authors are considering a pseudo-merger.
The experimental results suggest that the new firm’s behavior indeed
diﬀers from the competitors’, even though the only diﬀerence between the
merged entity and the remaining competitors is that it originates from for-
merly separated firms.
Experimental Result 2 In HKMN, the firm that originated from the merger
produces more than the symmetric Cornot quantity, the competitors produce
less. Profits of merging firms tend to increase in the short-term and are
roughly like the joint pre-merger profit in the long term (with details depend-
ing on the initial number of firms).
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Thus, the firm that originates from a merger behaves diﬀerently, even
though it does not diﬀer from the competitors with respect to the assets it
owns. Huck et al. propose the following psychological mechanism behind
their result: Each of the two merging firms has an aspiration level in mind
that is shaped by previous play. Falling below the aspiration level feels
like a loss.10 In the post-merger period, the newly merged firm aggressively
increases output to avoid falling behind the reference profit. The other firms
anticipate this and decrease their output somewhat. Thus, even though two
firms out of a pool of perfectly symmetric firms merged, the merger alone
creates an asymmetry, because after the merger, one of the firms has a much
higher reference profit than the others. As the experimental results show, this
is enough to substantially change the distribution of output levels between
firms. Thus, there is a slight movement towards Stackelberg behavior, even
though the post-merger decisions are made simultaneously.
This result is potentially relevant for competition policy: It suggests that
even in instances where two out of a pool of symmetric firms merge, the out-
come need not be symmetric. If the two merged firms each have a reference
profit in mind, the merger produces a new entity where the reference outcome
is the sum of the two reference profits, and hence creates an asymmetry, and
may even change the market structure from Cournot to Stackelberg.
More tentatively, the results also suggest that the type of merger may
matter for the subsequent outcome. The eﬀect in HKMN can only arise
in cases where both previous decision makers are still involved in the post-
merger firm.11 Thus, the result does not apply to situations where one firm
simply buys all the stock of the other firm, and the previous owners are not
10The argument is closely related to research in psychology showing that falling short
of a reference outcome by one unit is distinctly more painful than exceeding it by one
is pleasurable, and that the prospect of a loss can have a strong influence on behavior
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
11In fact, the authors show that the eﬀect is no longer present when one of the parties
to the merger is sent away with a compensation that does not depend on the preformance
of the merged entity.
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involved in the management subsequently.
Finally, unlike some of the experiments discussed earlier, the HKMN
analysis generates outcomes that do not just confirm the predictions of stan-
dard theory.
2.2 Real Mergers
2.2.1 Introduction
Real-world discussions of mergers hinge in an important way on the change
in asset ownership that goes along with a merger. In the theoretical or
experimental papers mentioned so far, however, there is no role for assets.
We therefore now move towards treatments of real mergers in which the
merged entity diﬀers from its component parts in some objective way. The
theoretical literature has considered a number of examples.
(1) Rationalization Mergers between suﬃciently heterogeneous firms where
the new entity works with the technology of the more eﬃcient con-
stituent part (Farrell and Shapiro 1990, Barros 1998).
(2) Synergy Mergers where the new entity works more eﬃciently than ei-
ther of the inside firms (Farrell and Shapiro 1990).
(3) Capacity Mergers where the merger combines the production capacities
of the constituent parts, so that the firm indeed has more assets (Perry
and Porter, 1985).
(4) Variety Mergers where the new firm produces a larger product spec-
trum than before (Deneckere and Davidson 1985, Aydemir and Schmut-
zler forthcoming).
We do not delve deeply into the welfare analysis of real mergers.12 Rather,
we just sketch why such mergers can potentially be beneficial for the insiders,
12The most useful source is still Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
12
though the details diﬀer. In cases (1) and (2), the driving force of the profit
increase is the cost reduction. In case (3), if the new firm has a high capacity
relative to its competitors, then it has some scope for setting high prices
without having to worry that the competitors can then supply the entire
market by undercutting them. In case (4), the merged entity benefits not only
from selling a larger number of products, but also indirectly from controlling
the prices of a larger number of products. Either way, unlike in the pseudo-
merger case, the profits of the merged entity may well be higher than for the
joint profits of the inside firm.
For real mergers, the eﬀects on competitors and customers may also diﬀer
from the pseudo-merger case. This is most easily seen for synergy mergers:
With suﬃciently strong synergy eﬀects, if the marginal costs of the merging
firms are considerably lower than the costs of its constituent parts, the new
firm will set lower prices in equilibrium. Thus, competitors suﬀer from “neg-
ative merger externalities” in spite of the reduction in the number of firms,
whereas customers benefit from the lower prices. When synergies are small,
however, the anti-competitive eﬀects familiar from the pseudo-merger case
dominate, giving rise to “positive merger externalities” for competitors and
detrimental eﬀects on consumer surplus.
The analysis so far suggests:
(i) Whether a real merger is beneficial for customers depends on the details
of the situation, in particular, on the size of synergies.
(ii) Mergers tend to be beneficial for customers when they are bad for
outside firms.
Laboratory experiments are well-suited to investigate real mergers, be-
cause costs, capacities and product spectrum can easily be controlled by the
experimentator. Relevant experiments have been carried out both in the
comparative static setting (corresponding to the upper right corner in Table
1) and in the dynamic setting (corresponding to the lower right corner).
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2.2.2 Static Case
We start with the static case. Isaac and Reynolds (1999) is the only example
we are aware of. Before outlining their approach, it is important to note that
their objective was not primarily to analyze mergers. Rather, they belong to
a large group of papers searching for the “magic number of firms” at which a
market becomes competitive. Nevertheless, comparing their treatments can
be potentially informative of the impact of mergers, as we will see below.
They use a two-by-two design where they vary the number of firms and their
capacity in such a way that the impact of the number of these parameters on
market outcomes can be examined. Firms post prices to computer-simulated
buyers who fully revealed trades.13 Importantly, demand was not known to
the sellers. The demand functions resulting in this way are step functions
so that there exists an entire range of prices that is compatible with the
competitive equilibrium.
Their treatments and basic results are summarized in Table 2.
Capacity of Firms
Low High
Prices are near the Prices are near the
Number 2 Cournot equilibrium upper range of the
of competitive equilibrium
Firms Prices are near the Prices are near to the
4 upper range of the lower bound of the
competitive equilibrium competitive equilibrium
Table 2: The design and the main results from Isaac and Reynolds (1999)
Three results are noteworthy. First, market prices never exceed the
Cournot prices. Second, the results suggest a consistent impact of excess
13The description of the demand side in this (preliminary) paper is not entirely clear at
the present stage. Specifically, some formulations suggest that the buyers are experimental
subjects themselves.
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capacity on market outcomes: Greater capacity leads to more eﬃcient out-
comes. Third, in this setting, there appears to be a number eﬀect: The lower
the number of firms, the less competitive the outcomes.
The first result diﬀers from the results one obtains in Cournot settings
without explicit capacity constraints: The most likely explanation appears
to be that demand uncertainty might make sellers cautious in their demands.
Additional interpretations might be possible if the treatment of the buyers
in the experiment was clearer. Suppose, as some formulations suggest, sellers
thought that the buyers were real players. Intuitively, having to present price
oﬀers to real buyers rather than “producing” to satisfy a computer-simulated
demand puts competitive pressure on firms (see, e.g., chapter 5 in Kagel and
Roth, 1995). Other research in experimental economics (Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler, 1988) suggests that fairness considerations on the behalf of the
buyers might contribute to this outcome. There is evidence that buyers reject
trades with a positive profit for them if the price is so high that it creates
a very unequal split of the surplus between the firm and the buyer.14 Thus,
the diﬀerences between Isaac and Reynolds (1999) and the Cournot examples
without capacity constraint appear to be related to the presence of “real”
buyers as opposed to a computer-simulated demand curve used in most other
experiments we discuss here.15 A better understanding of how the presence
of “real” buyers change the way mergers aﬀect market outcomes appears to
us as one of the areas where experiments could contribute to competition
policy.
14The results in Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) rely on exactly this mechanism,
though in a diﬀerent context.
15As an aside, fairness concerns can be relevant for competition policy because they
aﬀect the price elasticity. When a firm raises prices because of increased market power,
this would alter the distribution of surplus. If customers refuse to buy at the new “unfair”
price, the price elasticity might be quite large and the firm might, in fact, have very little
pricing power. On the contrary, if firms raise prices because costs have increased, this
price increase does not necessarily redistribute surplus towards the firm, and no fairness
eﬀect is expected. Thus, if one uses variation in costs to estimate the price elasticity, this
estimate may significantly overstate market power.
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2.2.3 Dynamic Case
Finally, we deal with real mergers in a dynamic setting. All the experiments
we consider have a common set-up. For a certain number of periods (typically
30), the firms play one oligopoly game. Then there is a change in the rules
of the game which usually involves a reallocation of assets between diﬀerent
firms. This may involve a full-fledged merger, but it may also just be a
capacity reallocation leading to growth of some firms at the expense of others.
After this exogenous shock, the modified game is played until the end of the
session.
Davis and Holt (1994) is an early example of such a paper. Their ex-
periments were designed to disentangle the eﬀects of capacity reallocation
and of changes in the number of firms on market power. In each period, the
players were confronted with one of three designs: “No-Power — Five Sellers”,
“Power — Five Sellers” and “Power — Three Sellers”.
In the “No-Power” Design, there are three large sellers, each with three
capacity units, and two small sellers, with one unit each.16 In the “Power —
Five Sellers" Design, a capacity reallocation takes place. As a result, there
are two remaining large firms, each with four capacity units, and three small
firms with one unit each. Thus, the change in market structure corresponds
to a situation where two of the three large firms each buy one third of the
assets of the third one, rather than to a full-fledged merger. In the “Three-
Seller”-Design, the three small firms from the “Power — Five Seller”-Design
merge. The crucial result of the paper is the following.
Experimental Result 3 In the Davis and Holt experiment, the shift from
the “No-Power — Five Seller”-Design to the “Power — Five Seller”-Design
has much greater impact on prices than the actual merger, that is, the shift
from “Power — Five Sellers” to “Power — Three Sellers”.
To understand this result, it is important to consider the nature of the
16For a precise argument, it is important that these units have diﬀerent marginal costs
but for the purpose of brevity, we ignore this.
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demand function with which the subjects are confronted. For each of the
first eight units, the willingness-to-pay of the (simulated) buyers is r, which
is substantially above the high marginal production costs. For the last three
units the willingness-to-pay is only slightly above marginal costs.
As a result, it makes an enormous diﬀerence for the pricing incentives of
sellers whether they have three or four units of capacity. In the former case,
competitors supply eight units to the market, which corresponds exactly to
the number of units which can be sold at a high price. In the latter case, the
competitors only have seven units, so that the seller can be sure to sell at least
one unit as long as he prices below r. Thus, the large sellers in the Power-
Treatment have considerably stronger incentives to set high prices than the
larger sellers in the No-Power treatments. The reallocation of capacity which
falls short of being a merger should thus be expected to lead to higher prices
on theoretical grounds. This idea is formalized by Davis and Holt, and it
is also confirmed in the lab. It turns out that the capacity reallocation has
price eﬀects that come close to what one would expect from a concentration-
increasing merger. The additional movement to the three-firm treatment has
a comparatively small eﬀect. Thus, a ”merger-like” capacity reallocation by
which two of the three largest firms become larger at the expense of the third
one has stronger eﬀects on market prices than the following merger between
the three smallest firms. Very roughly, this corresponds to the familiar idea
that mergers involving industry leaders should be viewed with greater caution
than mergers involving laggards. Before jumping to general conclusions,
however, one should take the very special nature of the demand function
into account.17
Davis and Wilson (2000) is an interesting paper pertaining to merger
policy. Like Davis and Holt (1994), the authors do not explicitly model a
merger, but consider the eﬀect of capacity reallocations that fall short of
17A second reason why the result should not be overstated is that the experiment again,
like much of the literature, uses simulated buyers. As pointed out before, this may matter
critically: In light of the previous evidence, it is not clear whether this result survives in
an experiment with real buyers.
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describing an actual merger. Nevertheless, the paper provides some insights
for the discussion of merger-related synergies. The standard problem facing
authorities is to weigh the expected increases in market power against poten-
tial eﬃciency eﬀects. We argued above that suﬃciently high eﬃciency gains
justify the merger not only from the insiders’ perspective, but also from a
social welfare point of view. The argument was implicitly based on an as-
sumption of constant marginal costs. In a setting with increasing marginal
costs which appears more appropriate for certain industries (e.g. electricity),
the potential positive eﬀects of cost savings on consumer surplus are less
obvious. Indeed, the following observation arises naturally.
Experimental Result 4 In the Davis and Wilson experiment, capacity-
reallocations that are accompanied by cost-reductions do not necessarily lead
to lower prices than capacity reallocations that are not.
The authors argue theoretically how this eﬀect comes about; they then
show that the theory is borne out in the lab. Intuitively, the idea depends on
the diﬀerence between eﬃciency increases concerning marginal units and ef-
ficiency increases concerning inframarginal units. While the former typically
tend to reduce market power, this is not true for the latter.
More precisely, the authors consider four treatments, N,P,NS, PS. The
N-treatment is similar to the “No-Power” Treatment in Davis and Holt
(1994) except that there are only three firms, two of which are large. Each of
the large firms has one low-cost (cL) unit of capacity and one high-cost (cH)
units. The small firm has one low-cost unit. Also as in Davis and Holt, mov-
ing to P corresponds to a market-power increasing reallocation of capacity:
One of the large firms (firm 1) now has both high-cost units, whereas the
other large firm only keeps its low-cost unit. Finally, the demand structure
is similar to Davis and Holt, with willingness to pay for the first three units
being r which is much higher than cH , and only slightly above cL for the
remaining two units. As before, therefore firm 1 has market power because
it can be sure to sell at least one unit at a high price; and the experiment
shows that prices are considerably higher in the P -treatment.
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The additional treatments allow for “synergies”. NS is like P , except
that the cost of producing the high-cost units cH drops to cL. PS is like P ,
except that the costs for producing those units remains at cH . However, the
costs of producing one of the low-cost units drop even further (to cLL).
The results from the experiment are as follows: First, prices in the no-
power treatment converge to the competitive equilibrium, irrespective of the
cost of the infra-marginal unit. Second, market power increases prices. Third,
moving from N to NS or from P to PS does not aﬀect mean prices. The
first statement says that a change of costs for marginal units neutralizes an
increase in market power - increasing capacity reallocations. The second
statement says that cost changes on inframarginal units do not aﬀect mean
prices.18
3 Horizontal Mergers: What have we learnt?
In the introduction, we raised four sets of questions that come up in merger
policy. We now discuss how the existing experimental literature has con-
tributed to answering these questions, and which contributions are conceiv-
able in the future. Much of the discussion will focus on the first question
concerning the eﬀects of mergers on profits and welfare.
3.1 The Welfare Eﬀects of Mergers
Existing merger policy literature (e.g. Neven et al. 1993, Motta 2004) has
identified a long list of factors that might influence whether the welfare eﬀects
of mergers are likely to be positive or negative. These factors include:
18At the risk of repeating ourselves, it should be pointed out that the buyers were
simulated in this experiment. In particular, having real buyers that are informed about
the changes in the market could have an interesting eﬀect: Based on the previous evi-
dence, we would expect buyers to lose power when cost savings on infra-marginal units
are introduced.
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1. Market concentration; 2. Synergies; 3. The Likelihood of Entry; 4.
Productive Capacities; 5. Demand Variables; 6. The Intensity of Competi-
tion; 7. Buyer Power.
1. Concentration
The most important parameters in the practical evaluation of mergers
are related to concentration. There is a broad consensus that, other
things being equal, the problematic eﬀects of mergers dominate when
(i) the initial concentration is large and (ii) the expected increase in
concentration resulting from the merger is strong. Most of the experi-
mental literature that is related to this issue concerns the case of sym-
metric firms. Moreover, it typically relates to pseudo-mergers where
the firms remain symmetric even after the merger. For these cases,
the literature surveyed by Huck et al. (2004) suggests that reductions
from three to two firms have substantial price eﬀects and similarly for
reductions from four to three firms, whereas mergers with larger initial
firm numbers are not problematic. In other words, as long as the post-
merger Herfindahl-Index (HHI) is 2500 or less, there is no reason to
worry.19 Taking this result literally would suggest that existing merger
policy might be slightly too restrictive.20
Unfortunately, the much more common scenario that firms are initially
asymmetric has not received much attention in the experimental lit-
erature. Thus, existing experiments have relatively little to say about
who should be allowed to merge with whom for some given initial con-
centration level. Roughly speaking, common practice is to take a more
hostile view towards mergers involving leaders than towards mergers in-
19The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms (in
percents), so it is 2500=4x252 for 4 identical firms.
20The U.S. merger guidelines recommend waving through a merger unconditionally if
the expected post-merger HHI is below 1,000. If the expected post-merger concentation
is higher, the merger is challenged unless the expected increase in the HHI is small, that
is, below 100 if the expected HHI is below 1,800 or below 50 otherwise (Motta 2004).
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volving laggards.21 Experiments are very well-suited to check whether
such rules of thumb make sense in principle.
Some very preliminary evidence in support of this practice can be ob-
tained from the study by Davis and Holt (1994). As discussed earlier,
the transition from the treatment “Five Sellers-No Power” to “Five-
Sellers-Power” has much in common with mergers by which two of the
leaders get larger. The transition from “Five Sellers-Power” to “Three
Sellers-Power”, however, is literally a merger between laggards. To re-
call, the increase in power was much stronger in the former case than
in the latter. This might be interpreted casually as suggesting that
mergers between laggards are less problematic than mergers between
leaders. However, one should be careful not to overemphasize the point.
At the very least, the peculiar demand structure of the Davis and Holt
experiments should be kept in mind: It would appear to be quite possi-
ble to construct demand functions where theory predicts that mergers
between laggards increase prices more than mergers between leaders,
and where experiments would come to the same conclusion. This points
to a limitation of experiments that is less a matter of principle than
a consequence of budgetary limitations. Often, even in fairly simple
theoretical models, the comparative-statics prediction about one para-
meter (e.g., the number of firms) may depend strongly on the remaining
parameters (e.g., of the demand function), which may take infinitely
many diﬀerent values. Observing how subjects react to changes of one
parameter in one or even a few of the infinitely many conceivable pa-
rameter constellations is better than observing nothing at all, but it is
arguably not enough to draw far-reaching conclusions.
2. Synergies
There seems to be very little debate that, the more a merger con-
tributes to reducing costs, the more likely it is to be welfare-increasing.
21This is implicit in the recommendations sketched in footnote 20.
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For fairly general situations, such a statement is hardly arguable on
theoretical grounds. Indeed, it seems so self-evident that an exper-
iment confirming it would hardly receive much attention. It is thus
not surprising that the only experimental paper we mentioned on the
issues of synergies is one that cautions against the notion that syner-
gies must necessarily make mergers more desirable. Davis and Wilson
(2000) deserve credit for pointing this out. However, as interesting as
their example may be, without further evidence it provides no cause
for rethinking the simple rule of thumb that substantial synergies not
only make the merger desirable for the insiders, but also for consumers.
After all, the example relies not only on a relatively special type of syn-
ergy, but also on a very special case of demand function. It is also worth
pointing out that the experimental evidence of Davis and Holt is quite
consistent with theory. In fact, the authors derived it from standard
game-theoretical reasoning.
3. Entry
The undesired eﬀect of a merger on market power may well be mitigated
by potential entry. Thus, mergers in markets where sunk costs play a
limited role are generally seen as less problematic than in industries
with high sunk costs. While we are not aware of any experiments
that deal directly with the influence of sunk costs on merger policy,
there is a related literature comparing the behavior of monopolists in
settings with and without entry barriers. While the evidence for a very
strong disciplining role of potential competition is mixed, there is some
support for the idea that such a role is more likely when sunk costs are
low.22
4. Productive Capacities
Whether a merger causes competitive harm may well depend on the
22See Coursey et al. (1984), Harrison and Mc Kee (1985), Harrison et al. (1989), Millner
et al. (1990). This literature is framed as a test of the contestable markets hypotheses of
Baumol et al. (1982), which has been criticized by Tirole (1988) and others.
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outside firm’s productive capacities. If the competitors have excess
capacities initially, the merger does not necessarily increase the market
power of the merging parties very much as they must take into account
that competitors can easily supply the market as a response to a price
increase. To our knowledge, this idea has not yet been tested directly
in the laboratory. However, the experiment of Isaac and Reynolds
suggests this conjecture may be true. At least for given firm numbers,
excess capacity of some firms increased competitiveness.
5. Demand Variables
It is well known that high demand elasticity can discipline the price-
setting behavior of firms. The elasticities of market demand are there-
fore also important to estimate the potential negative eﬀects of mergers
on market power. Again, there seems to have been no direct attempt
to assess the role of demand for mergers in the lab by comparing treat-
ments where everything else is fixed. Davis and Holt (1994) and Davis
and Wilson (2000), however, have exploited the eﬀect of demand elas-
ticity in their experiments.There, if the merger reduces the elasticity of
(firm) demand substantially, the observed market power tends to rise,
which is consistent with the theoretical prediction.
6. Intensity of Competition
Often, there are some firms in the pre-merger market who compete
more vigorously with each other than with the remaining firms. Specif-
ically, this will be true when they are producing closer substitutes. A
merger between such firms who are initially intense competitors should
have stronger price eﬀects than a merger between firms who are not
competing vigorously even before the merger. Again, we are not aware
of any experiments comparing the eﬀects of mergers under diﬀerent
assumptions about pre-merger competition (except when intensity of
competition is identified with the number of firms).
7. Buyer Power
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In many important merger cases, the firms face buyers who operate
in imperfectly competitive markets themselves. In such cases, buyer
power may constrain the market power of the merged firm.23 Even
though we are not aware of any existing experiment investigating the
eﬀects of buyer power on merger performance, such an analysis is clearly
possible. The literature above typically dealt with simulated demand,
which corresponds to low buyer power. If, instead the buyer side was
modeled with a small number of real buyers, it would presumably be
possible to understand the role of buyer power better. The paper by
Ruﬄe (2006) in this volume is a useful starting point in this direction,
even though it is only concerned with buyer power, not with its relation
to merger preformance.
3.2 The Circumstances Fostering Merger Activity
Actual competition policy is mainly concerned with the eﬀects of mergers.
Understanding their causes may appear to be merely of an academic interest
at first glance. However, understanding which circumstances lead to mergers
is essential in judging how they should be viewed from a competition policy
perspective. If we knew that firms want to merge precisely when this has
positive welfare eﬀects, there would be no rationale for merger policy.
In some ways, such an alignment of interests does not seem so far-fetched:
For instance, when there are strong synergies, firm owners and consumers
should both benefit from mergers. In other ways, however, the private and
the public interest are likely to diverge. For instance, mergers between firms
that already have high market shares may be particularly attractive to the
firms, but particularly undesirable for consumers. In the extreme case of
the homogeneous, linear Cournot model without synergies, mergers between
duopolists are the only profitable ones, and they clearly have a very negative
welfare eﬀect. Similarly, mergers between firms that are initially more com-
23Neven et al. (1993) argue that buyer power was important in at least three European
merger cases (Alcatel/Telettra, Viag/Continental Can and Alcatel/AEG Kabel).
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petitive than others appear particularly profitable and particularly likely at
the same time. More generally, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have provided a
theoretical analysis of the relation between merger profitability and welfare
eﬀects.
Experiments do not seem to have addressed these issues. It would seem
quite possible to confront subjects with the decision whether they want to
merge in diﬀerent experimental settings where some mergers are desirable
from a social point of view and others are not, and then investigate how the
decision to merge is correlated with its social desirability.
3.3 Rules of Thumb
In theoretical models, the welfare eﬀects of mergers are judged on the basis
of information that is typically not readily available for competition policy
authorities, at least not within the time frame that is necessary to judge
whether a merger should be allowed or not. Most obviously, this informa-
tion includes demand and cost functions. More fundamentally, the standard
welfare analysis of mergers proceeds as though there was a clearly defined
product market. It is well known, however, that in most actual merger cases,
it is not entirely obvious what the relevant market is. Practical merger policy
uses rules of thumb to deal with these problems.
(i) A common practice to find the relevant market is the SSNIP Test (Motta
2004), which asks whether a “small but significant non-transitory increase
in prices” in the market under consideration would be profitable for a hy-
pothetical monopolist. If the answer is aﬃrmative, then the possibility fo
substituting the goods in the market by using outside goods is limited, and
there is no need to move to a wider market. In implementing the SSNIP test,
own-and cross price elasticities play an important role, with high elasticities
suggesting low price eﬀects of mergers. While experiments are clearly of no
help in estimating real-world demand elasticities which are used to define the
relevant markets, we have already argued that they could be designed to bet-
ter understand the relation between elasticities and merger eﬀects, precisely
25
because the demand functions are controlled by the experimentator.24
(ii) Once the relevant market is defined, the standard approach in the U.S.
to screen out unproblematic mergers is to use the pre-merger Herfindahl-
index as a measure of concentration and calculate the expected post-merger
Herfindahl-index under the assumption that the new firm’s market share is
the sum of shares of the inside firms (see footnote 20). In principle, one
could design experiments to analyze the relation between post-merger HHI
and merger price eﬀects in diﬀerent environments. Though the evidence from
the pseudo-merger experiments suggests otherwise, such an analysis might
reveal that the relation between post-merger HHI, its increase and the price
eﬀects is not suﬃciently close to justify relying on it as a rule of thumb.
(iii) If the analysis of concentration reveals a potential problem, additional
information will be looked at to clear the merger, including buyer power, po-
tential entry, synergies, and so on. For instances, an eﬃciency defense might
be applied it the parties involved can convince the authorities of substantial
synergies from the merger. Davis and Wilson (2000) motivate their paper
by arguing that U.S. procedures to assess whether cost synergies might jus-
tify a merger are problematic. To determine whether consumers are likely
to benefit from whatever eﬃciency gains a merger might generate, historical
pass-through rates are sometimes considered, the idea being that if cost re-
ductions were passed through to the consumers in the past, this should also
be true in the future. One implication of the Davis and Wilson paper is that
this is hardly true in general.
A related issue concerns the usage of simulation models to estimate merger
eﬀects. The U.S. Department of Justice uses an "Antitrust Litigation Model"
(ALM) to screen mergers. This model requires relative little information,
24Of course, the choice of demand functions and, in particular, elasticities could be
guided by real-world data (See Hong and Plott 1982 for such an approach in a diﬀerent
setting). Also note that the direct control of the experimentor only relates to market
demand, not to the perceived demand of each firm which also depends on competitor
reactions (see Neven et al 1993).
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which makes it easy to apply.25 It also relies on very specific assumptions,
however. Davis (2002) uses laboratory experiments to compare the perfor-
mance of the model in a setting which comes close to the ALM set-up with
the ALM predictions. It also checks for the robustness of the behavior to
violations of the ALM assumptions.
The evidence suggests that
(i) The ALM predictions are not correct in general, but
(ii) screens out nonproblematic mergers quite well.
Summing up, though relatively little has been done in this respect, ex-
periments are potentially useful for evaluating rules of thumb.
4 Vertical Mergers
As indicated above, there has been much discussion about the precise welfare
eﬀects of horizontal mergers. However, most debates concern the question
which types of mergers are detrimental to welfare. There is not much dis-
agreement that horizontal mergers can have negative eﬀects in principle. Ac-
cordingly, regulation of horizontal mergers is firmly established. The policy
towards vertical merger is much less uniform. In the U.S., for instance, peri-
ods of hostility towards mergers were followed by periods were the antitrust
authorities took a more lenient view (e.g., Kwoka and White 1999).
In a similar vein, industrial organization theory has not come to a definite
conclusion about the eﬀects of vertical mergers. The disputed issues do not
concern vertical integration per se. For instance, mergers between upstream
and downstream firms in a bilateral monopoly are usually seen as eﬃciency-
enhancing. Similarly, there is relatively little concern that oligopolies where
all firms are vertically integrated are less desirable than oligopolies where all
firms are separated.26 However, the welfare discussion of asymmetric vertical
25The model uses information on prices, market shares, demand elasticity and substi-
tuability to infer the industry cost structure, which is then used to predict post-merger
performance.
26Therefore, an experiment of Mason and Phillips (2000) demonstrating that a vertically-
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integration in successive oligopolies is not settled. The debate circles around
two main issues.
First, if there is an asymmetric vertical structure, does it matter? Propo-
nents of unconstrained integration emphasize its eﬃciency eﬀects: Because
of technical reasons (economies of scope) or because of the elimination of
a double mark-up, integration is believed to reduce marginal costs of the
integrating firms. Opponents highlight the potential foreclosure eﬀects: In-
tegration is seen as a commitment not to serve downstream rivals, which is
likely to result in higher production costs for these competitors and thus in
reduced outputs. The theoretical literature is ambiguous about whether in-
tegration will lead to foreclosure eﬀects and whether they will dominate over
the eﬃciency eﬀects. The answer depends on such details as the number
of upstream and downstream firms, the demand functions, and the type of
contracts between suppliers and downstream firms that are allowed (Salinger
1988, Rey and Tirole forthcoming). Second, even in situations where the
potential negative foreclosure eﬀects of asymmetric vertical integration exist
and dominate over the welfare gains from higher eﬃciency of the integrated
firm, is there reason to believe that asymmetric vertical integration is likely
to occur? The Chicago School (Bork 1978) has argued that asymmetric ver-
tical integration is likely to create a bandwagon eﬀect, with non-integrated
firms following their integrated counterparts. Meanwhile, however, many
authors have used game-theoretic reasoning to explain why asymmetric inte-
gration may well be an equilibrium outcome in fairly general circumstances
(Ordover et al. 1990, Jansen 2003, Bühler and Schmutzler 2005). This is also
consistent with empirical evidence. Even so, the debate is far from settled.
In principle, therefore, experiments might contribute to answering the open
questions.
Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001), henceforce MNS, is presumably
the best-developed contribution to the subject.27 These authors design their
integrated industry produces higher output than its separated counterpart does not quite
get at the heart of the problem.
27Other vaguely related contributions are Elliot et al. (2003), and Mason and Phillips
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experiment to come close to the setting of Rey and Tirole. In their design,
an upstream sector produces an essential input for the downstream sector.
In one group of scenarios (separation), one firm is exclusively active on the
upstream market, and there are two downstream firms. In a second scenario
(integration), the upstream firmmerges with one of the downstream firms. In
all treatments, the upstream firms oﬀer a contract to each downstream firm,
specifying the amount of input they are prepared to deliver and a payment
they expect in return. Downstream firms decide whether to accept or reject.
Upstream firms also decide how much to produce themselves. Essentially,
the authors ask how the vertical merger aﬀects market performance, that is,
output prices and firm profits.
The results provide some support for foreclosure theories.
Experimental Result 5 In the integration treatment of MNS, total quan-
tities are lower and upstream profits are higher than in the various separated
treatments.
This is consistent with the idea that the integrated firm finds it easier to
commit to an output restriction in the integrated case than in the separated
case.
Though the argument that vertical integration can be problematic comes
across quite convincingly, there are several caveats. First, as the authors
themselves note, not all the theoretical predictions of Rey and Tirole are con-
firmed.28 Second, the set-up of MNS has been chosen in a way that is highly
conducive to foreclosure. In particular, because there is only one upstream
firm, competitors cannot step in to supply separated downstream firms when
they are foreclosed by the upstream firm. While there are very important
cases, where an upstreammonopoly faces several downstream competitors, in
particular network industries, many industries are better described as sequen-
tial oligopolies. In these industries, it is much more controversial whether
(2000).
28Specifically, the eﬀect of the types of contracts allowed on performance diﬀers from
the predictions.
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foreclosure can be successful. Third, the analysis has nothing to say about
bandwagoning issues. As the vertical industry structure is fixed, the authors
cannot clarify whether firms will respond to vertical integration by integrat-
ing themselves. Thus, they say nothing about whether asymmetric vertical
integration is likely to arise. Obviously, answering this question would not
only require endogenous integration decisions, but also more than one up-
stream competitor.
In spite of these qualifications, the analysis of MNS is clearly promising.
To repeat, however, at this stage, it is premature to draw far-reaching con-
clusions about the eﬀects of integration: Theory suggests that the eﬀects of
vertical integration depend in a subtle and not very transparent ways on such
details as demand functions, the number of upstream and downstream firms
and the type of contracts that are allowed. We should therefore be reluctant
to put too much weight on the outcomes of a small series of experiments:
It may well be that familiar ambiguities from theory would also show up in
experimental research if suﬃciently many design variations were considered.
5 Conglomerate Mergers
Unlike horizontal or even vertical mergers, conglomerate mergers receive rela-
tively little attention by competition policy authorities. Though it has often
been debated whether excessive diversification is healthy for the firms in-
volved, there is little worry that, by expanding into unrelated markets, a firm
might be able to exercise more market power. Nevertheless, conglomerate
mergers could potentially be problematic from a joint dominance perspec-
tive. This stance was already taken by Edwards (1955) who conjectures that
"... the prospect of advantage from vigorous competition in one market may
be weighted against the danger of retaliatory forays by the competitor in
other markets ..." (Phillips and Mason 1992, p. 395). A more recent paper
by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) uses a game-theoretic setting to inves-
tigate whether multi-market contact might foster collusive behavior. Their
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argument why this might be true formalizes the simple idea that for firms
who meet in several markets, the costs of deviating from collusive behavior
are high, because a breakdown of collusion will lead to losses in more than
one market. However, they also highlight that the argument is not quite as
straightforward as it seems, because the potential gains from deviation are
also higher under multi-market interaction. Thus, the eﬀects of multi-market
interaction are typically ambiguous. Roughly speaking, collusion decreases
on the relatively collusive market and increases on the less collusive market.
These ideas pertain to such conglomerate mergers that, before the merger,
some other firms are already active in at least two of the markets under
consideration: Then the merger creates multi-market contact where there
was none before.
A small number of experiments have been carried out to check whether
multi-market contact indeed has a positive eﬀect on collusion. For instance,
Phillips and Mason (1992) conduct a series of experiments to analyze how
multi-market contact aﬀects pricing. The underlying two individual markets
are chosen so that, in one of them, collusion is easier to sustain than in
the other one in the absence of multi-market contact. The authors compare
output decisions in each individual market with output in an experiment
where each firm operates in both markets. The results basically confirm
theory.
Experimental Result 6 In the Phillips and Mason experiment, multi-market
contact increases prices on the less collusive markets and decreases them on
the more collusive market.
6 Conclusions
6.1 Overview
In this paper, we surveyed experimental work that relates to merger policy
analysis. In the remainder of this paper, we shall argue that, although these
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experiments have generated some interesting results, the analysis has not yet
produced insights into merger policy that would either give more confidence
into the conventional wisdom on merger policy or, to the contrary, suggest a
fundamental rethinking of familiar ideas. However, we shall also argue that,
to some extent these limitations can be overcome.
6.2 Existing Work and its Limitations
A large body of experimental research deals quite directly with the relation
between market structure and performance. Some of this work is applicable
to merger policy in a very broad sense. For instance, many papers support
the notion that reductions in the number of firms tend to induce higher
prices, which is the basis for merger policy. A much smaller number of
papers discuss experiments that were specifically designed to address mergers.
For instance, some authors ask how mergers aﬀect diﬀerent parties. Others
attempt to clarify whether certain practices that are used in merger policy
are reasonable. By and large, these papers come to reasonable conclusions,
either confirming standard intuition or suggesting in a plausible way why such
intuition may be flawed. There are some interrelated limitations, however.
First, and most importantly, it is hard to discern a clear research agenda.
Each paper appears to attack a fairly isolated issue, and there is no clear sense
of direction. Second, only a small fraction of the large number of potentially
interesting questions in the area has been addressed. Third, arguably, one
might complain that those results that have been obtained so far are rela-
tively unspectacular. On the one hand, we have not seen a robust-looking
corroboration of any truly contested idea: Competition-policy authorities
cannot not appeal to existing experiments to judge if and how eﬃciency de-
fenses, buyer power or potential entry should be weighed in merger cases.
On the other hand, there seems to be no example where any undisputed idea
has been refuted in a convincing manner: For instance, the experiments do
not give us a reason to advise against the use of concentration measures as
a useful first step in judging the desirability of mergers. However, we should
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emphasize that there is also a scientific value to experiments that simply
confirm what most people would have expected anyway.
6.3 The Potential for Improvements
Some of the problems just sketched can be overcome quite easily, at least
in principle. The simplest step is to carry out a more extensive discussion
about which kind of topics, relating to merger policy should be addressed
with experiments. Some of the comments in this paper point in this direc-
tion, but they clearly fall short of a full-fledged research agenda. In addition,
a "simple" way to improve the output of experimental research on competi-
tion policy would be to invest more resources. In particular, robust insights
on such issues as to which factors make mergers less problematic might be
obtained by carrying out many similar experiments with small modifications.
There are also a number of other limitations: many potentially interest-
ing questions in the area relate to comparative-statics results which might
depend in a very subtle way on those parameters that are kept fixed in the
comparative-statics exercise. As each experiment only corresponds to one
specific realization of these fixed parameters, even obtaining clear comparative-
statics observations in a small number of experiments may not convince us
fully of the generality of such a statement.
Further, many of the decisive issues in merger policy depend on specific
knowledge of the particular case. In principle, one might design experiments
that fit the particular case to inform policy makers. Unfortunately, given the
usual time frames of merger policy, this appears very diﬃcult.
Finally, even for authors who are sympathetic to experimental research
it is not obvious that the lab is ideally suited to test theories on problems
involving very large time-scales: In the real-world, the impact of mergers only
becomes entirely clear after many months or even years oof adjustment. At
the very least, therefore, the external validity of merger experiments should
be discussed with a healthy dose of skepticism.
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